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1 
From Heredity to Genetics: Political, Medical, and Agro-
Industrial Contexts 
Staffan Müller-Wille and Christina Brandt 
The essays collected in this volume follow up on an earlier volume, Heredity Produced: At 
the Crossroads of Biology, Politics, and Culture, 1500–1870, that dealt with the cultural 
history of heredity from the early modern period to the middle of the nineteenth century.1 
They provide a fresh approach to the history of the life sciences from the late nineteenth 
century to the first decades of the twentieth century—a period which has sometimes been 
characterized as a period of thorough transformation in the life sciences more generally.2 This 
present volume, Heredity Explored: Between Public Domain and Experimental Science, 
1850–1930, is devoted to the historical analysis of a broad variety of scientific and social 
arenas in which the phenomena of inheritance acquired far-reaching economic, cultural, and 
political relevance and was investigated both experimentally and theoretically. While the 
authors of this volume therefore present some very different perspectives, their studies have 
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one thing in common: they show that a history of heredity includes much more than the 
history of genetics, and that knowledge of heredity was always more than the knowledge 
formulated as Mendelism. 
The first volume, Heredity Produced, foregrounded the formation of what the two 
editors in their introduction described as an “epistemic space” of heredity in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The origin of a general biological concept of heredity 
was a relatively late historical phenomenon, culminating in Francis Galton’s and Charles 
Darwin’s theories of heredity in the 1860s and 1870s. Previously, hereditary transmission had 
not usually been treated as a phenomenon that could be separated from the contingencies of 
conception, pregnancy, or embryonic development, or more generally, from generation and 
development.3 If heredity was studied as a sui generis phenomenon, this typically happened in 
disciplines that addressed not the normal or the natural but the pathological and the artificial. 
It was physicians and breeders—with their interest in how a disease could become permanent, 
or a novel trait “fixed”—who were the first to describe the transmission of traits using legal 
metaphors of inheritance.4 
At one and the same time, almost in the manner of an oxymoron, the concept of 
heredity thus drew attention to phenomena involving variation and constancy, deviance and 
permanence, divergence and common origin—hence the increasing political significance of 
the concept in the context of emerging European nation states and their imperial ambitions; 
heredity was (and continues to be) a concept that could be mobilized for a whole range of 
ideological purposes: to celebrate progress, reinforce identity, or denounce deviance.5 The 
authors of Heredity Produced analyzed how the “epistemic space” of heredity was articulated 
by a step-by-step aggregation and integration of conceptual, representational, and practical 
tools that circulated within, and among, several domains. The works produced within these 
domains—asylum records and breeders’ registers, species catalogs and racial classifications, 
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pedigrees and analyses of trait distributions across populations and generations—all 
established heredity as a distributed phenomenon that was adequately addressed by 
classification, statistical analysis, and morphological reasoning.6 
As with the first volume, this one also focuses on a period that can be considered a 
threshold in the history of heredity. The first volume was concerned with the historical 
dynamics that produced the diverse array of phenomena that “heredity,” as a general 
biological concept, came to address in the second half of the nineteenth century. In Heredity 
Explored, we focus on the subsequent period in which the epistemic space of heredity was 
increasingly consolidated to eventually form the “epistemic object” of a dedicated discipline, 
genetics. In the course of this development, heredity changed from an object that was 
distributed in time and space to a more or less tangible entity that could be produced and 
directly assessed within the confines of specialized spaces, such as laboratories, experimental 
stations, and data collections. The advent of genetics at that time, seen from a longue durée 
perspective, thus confronts us with a fundamental inversion, one that could be represented 
visually as an hourglass figure.7 In the second half of the nineteenth century a variety of 
discourses flourished in which different concepts of heredity took shape. From 1900 onward, 
knowledge of heredity, in all its diverse aspects, appears to have been shaped by a highly 
specialized discourse: the new discourse of genetics, which soon began to colonize a variety 
of scientific and cultural domains with its concepts, standards, and technologies. 
Historians of biology, especially those with a professional background in biology, 
have therefore long been fascinated with the history of genetics. Quite naturally, this 
historical focus often led to a preoccupation with the “milestones” in the development of the 
discipline, such as Mendel’s experiments in the early 1860s, the “rediscovery” of his laws in 
1900, the debates between biometricians and Mendelians, or the origins and achievements of 
the Morgan school of Drosophila genetics.8 The gene has appeared as the very manifestation 
Page 4 of 37 
of the concept of heredity ever since. In hindsight, the gene therefore seems like an inevitable 
outcome of the protracted attempts of late-nineteenth-century biologists to identify the agents 
of heredity and to discern the laws they obeyed. And so too does the gene appear as the 
foundation stone on which the thoroughly molecularized biology of today has been built.9 
This collection of essays is also concerned with the period around 1900 as an 
important turning point, but in contrast to previous scholarship we intend to go beyond the 
focus on Mendel’s rediscovery. Our authors describe a complex period in the history of 
European countries and their “offshoots” in the New World, a period which witnessed the 
second industrial revolution, the demographic transition, and the so-called “laboratory 
revolution” in medicine. Their contributions demonstrate that a focus on the discipline of 
genetics, or even a history of heredity that takes the advent of genetics as its end point or 
starting point, is much too narrow to get an appropriate historical understanding of 
developments in the life sciences at that time. This does not mean that we intend to play down 
the significance of genetics (nor the significance of an earlier generation of historians). But 
the centrality of the gene for twentieth-century life sciences or, even more specifically, for the 
continuing history of heredity, is far from self-evident and needs to be accounted for by a 
different set of factors than the mere dynamics of scientific inquiry.10 
We have therefore arranged the chapters of this volume in five sections that start with 
the broader cultural and political contexts that shaped knowledge of heredity and then 
gradually “zoom in” on increasingly specialized fields of inquiry, ending with a section that 
readdresses the origins of genetics from what we hope is a newly gained vantage point. The 
first section deals with heredity as an ever-present theme in the debates about identity, 
kinship, and reproduction that accompanied the formation of modern nation states. The 
second section looks at biology in general as a source of new biopolitical conceptions of 
heredity, degeneration, and gender. The third section turns to detailed analyses of the agro-
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industrial contexts of the newly emerging genetic rationality around 1900. In the fourth 
section, the authors explore different approaches to heredity in a variety of medical research 
fields from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. And finally, the last section deals 
with the genealogical constructs and experimental systems of genetics that turned heredity 
into a representable and manipulable object. Before we turn to the question of what this 
strategy of “zooming in” reveals about genetics and its lasting legacy, we would like to take 
the reader on a tour through the various contributions to this volume. 
1.1 Heredity between the Sciences and the Public Sphere 
The peculiar role of thinking in terms of heredity, in political and cultural discourses around 
1900, was, as mentioned above, grounded in the historical developments of a period that saw 
a massive wave of industrialization and associated demographic changes. As a consequence, 
liberal values of a rising middle class began to clash with political and social movements 
centered on ideas of shaping populations and engineering social life, reinforcing 
developments that had been going on since the 1860s when evolutionary theories began to 
nourish ideas of social and cultural progress in general, and eugenic hopes for 
“improvement,” and corresponding fears of “degeneration,” in particular. Heredity provided a 
very convenient tool for the proponents of such visions since it foregrounded the formation of 
identity and difference on a whole range of levels, beginning with the bourgeois family and 
ranging from ethnic or racial minorities to entire classes and nations. The transfer of meanings 
that the concept of heredity brought about went in both directions: heredity served as a frame 
for the technological and cultural appropriation of nature, just as much as it was used to 
interpret the political and cultural manifestations of human history and diversity.11 The notion 
of “biohistorical narratives” that Veronika Lipphardt develops in her chapter captures this 
Janus-faced character of heredity very well and highlights that “heredity” around 1900 was 
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inseparably both an object of the natural sciences and their applications in agriculture, 
industry, and medicine, as well as a powerful metaphor deployed in the service of identity 
formation and political struggle. Societies came to be seen as “transmission machineries”—as 
Ulrike Vedder puts it in her contribution—from which nobody was able to escape. 
Vedder provides a fresh perspective on the history of heredity by tracing the literary 
figure of the “bachelor.” At first glance an unlikely figure to enter the scene of our inquiry, 
the bachelor nevertheless has a lot to reveal about family, property transmission, genealogy, 
and heredity in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The bachelor was (and remains) a 
controversial figure, being both a product of the emerging bourgeois society, as well as a 
challenge to it. The nineteenth-century tendency to naturalize the family, and the emerging 
discourse on degeneration, became crystallized in the figure of the bachelor, a paradox 
personified, being both sterile and productive at the same time. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
the bachelor was still depicted as an integral part of family networks. However, toward the 
end of the century, he became more and more viewed as a “natural failure” that terminated 
genealogies. At the same time, the bachelor was increasingly regarded as a paragon of cultural 
productivity, free from the constraints of tradition.12 
By comparing public and legal debates about marriage between cousins from the 
1830s until the early twentieth century, Diane B. Paul and Hamish G. Spencer throw light on 
interesting—and also unexpected—aspects of the links between popular beliefs, state 
regulation, and scientific research. The question of whether or not marriage between cousins 
was a harmful cultural practice was highly controversial in both the United States and Great 
Britain, and some U.S. states legislated against it. Eugenicists were often approached to 
provide expertise about the benefits and risks of cousin marriage, among them George 
Darwin, whose own family background was perceived by many as problematic (the Darwin 
and Wedgwood clans cultivated cousin marriage to such a degree that historian Jim Moore 
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has referred to them as the “Darwoods”). Whereas eugenicists often came to no clear 
statement in favor of, or against, cousin marriage, folk beliefs at the time increasingly 
associated the practice with increased risks of degeneration. Paul and Spencer conclude that 
the enactment of state laws against marriage between cousins in the United States, but not in 
Europe, is principally explained by the fact that in the former the practice was associated with 
rural-dwelling, poverty-stricken lower classes and in the latter with elites, and by the porous 
and decentralized character of the American political system. The debate about cousin 
marriage thus provides a historical case, showing that eugenics experts had a very limited 
influence on state policies, and that the eugenics movement was driven “from behind” by 
strong sociocultural undercurrents.13 
Theodore M. Porter presents us with a glimpse into the world of late-nineteenth- and 
early-twentieth-century institutions for the mentally ill, which, alongside prisons, military 
conscription, compulsory schooling, and census taking, provided the institutional frameworks 
that channeled the sociocultural undercurrents just mentioned. From his analysis it becomes 
clear that statistical approaches to human heredity predated and encompassed human genetics. 
These approaches were closely associated with modern notions of the state—in particular, the 
notion of its “population” which became as important as the territory it encompassed for 
definitions of the nation state. Starting with German asylum policies in the late nineteenth 
century, Porter goes on to analyze the practices of the Eugenics Record Office in Cold Spring 
Harbor, New York, which was initiated by Charles Davenport in 1911 in order to create a 
comprehensive database on human genetics. Statistics, and in particular new methods of 
gathering and managing huge amounts of data, such as filing systems, played a fundamental 
role in the formation of the new science of human genetics. As a science, human genetics has 
from its inception been closely entangled with the bureaucratic control and management of 
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institutionalized populations, and this, in turn, shaped popular understandings of human 
heredity around 1900.14 
With the concept of “biohistorical narratives,” Veronika Lipphardt adds another 
dimension to the exchanges between public and expert discourse by pointing to narrative 
modes of identity construction in nation building and the consolidation of ethnic minorities. 
According to her account, biohistorical narratives emerge when historical processes and 
events are interpreted in biological terms. Endogamic practices of Jewish populations in 
Europe, for example, were frequently read as genetic isolationism. Lipphardt analyzes the 
genetic research of the German–Jewish anthropologist Wilhelm Nussbaum along these lines. 
Nussbaum was a student of the eugenicist Eugen Fischer and worked with Franz Boas in the 
United States after his forced emigration from Germany. Lipphardt’s chapter throws new light 
on well-known controversies between so-called neo-Darwinism and neo-Lamarckism around 
1900. Not only were the deterministic views of heredity that underpinned Mendelism and 
neo-Darwinism used in eugenics and German “race hygiene” to support growing anti-Semitic 
views of the “inalterability of Jews,” but neo-Darwinian standpoints, as well as racial biology, 
were also used by some Jewish scientists as a means to defend their emancipation. The sad 
and tragic story of Nussbaum’s research serves as a strong reminder that there is no 
straightforward correlation between concepts of heredity and political convictions.15 
Most studies that attend to the contexts of, for example, racial anthropology or 
eugenics in the nineteenth century take inheritance as a necessary component of nineteenth-
century biologistic ideologies but do not further question that component themselves. With 
the great variety of hereditary theories we encounter in the late nineteenth century it seems, 
however, that the very notion of inheritance was not a stable one but deeply troubled in ways 
that are only inadequately understood by the standard oppositions of “soft” and “hard,” 
“blending” and “nonblending” inheritance. Questions of “heredity” touched long-standing 
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problems in the life sciences such as the relationship between parts and wholes, between 
internal and external conditions, or between the origin and preservation of variation in 
evolution. Moreover, because heredity has become a central research problem in different 
fields such as psychiatry, medicine, breeding research, cell biology, and evolutionary theory 
since the mid-nineteenth century, the term “heredity” itself has been used with a multitude of 
slightly different meanings. Many, for example, reserved it for the transmission of species-
specific characteristics, relying on other designations for the transmission of variable traits. 
Most importantly, however, a variety of hypothetical–speculative theories of heredity 
emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century that by no means gave a homogenous 
picture on a conceptual level, let alone generally accepted answers of how to understand 
heredity. 
In his classic article “From Heredity Theory to Vererbung,” Fredrick Churchill has 
shown how Vererbung (the German term for “heredity”) had become a widespread theoretical 
problem in the 1880s, being part of a watershed in biology that was created with the rise of 
cytology. During this period, biologists raised the problem of heredity as a question that was 
separate from, and followed a different logic than, cell differentiation during ontogeny. New 
ideas of a “continuity that preserved the organized material of transmission” laid the basis for 
a “modern” conception of heredity, turning away from older assumptions in which 
reproduction, growth, and heredity were explained by the same principles.16 However, if 
heredity could not yet be taken as a given by nineteenth-century biologists, the question 
remains why biologists were so deeply concerned about it? As is made clear in the chapters 
by Jean Gayon, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Staffan Müller-Wille, and Helga Satzinger in the 
second section of this book, the answer to this question, apart from cytological advances, is 
also to be sought out at the level of ideology. In his philosophical analysis of Darwinism, Jean 
Gayon has argued that evolution and heredity were two faces of the same coin.17 With 
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Darwin’s theory, however, the world was seen not only as full of evolutionary variation, but 
also as a world in which continuity and stability were not guaranteed and needed to be 
safeguarded against the endless vicissitudes of life, to paraphrase Charles Lyell.18 It is 
therefore not surprising to find that heredity theories resonated strongly with contemporary 
debates about the relationship between citizen and state, between progress, decline, and 
tradition, as well as the contributions of the two sexes to social (re-)production. 
In their discussion of “Heredity before Genetics” in this volume, Rheinberger and 
Müller-Wille provide an overview and comparison of the highly hypothetical theories of 
heredity that were proposed by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, Rudolf Virchow, Carl Nägeli, 
Claude Bernard, Ernst Haeckel, August Weismann, Hugo de Vries, and Edmund Beecher 
Wilson. For some of them, heredity was still a kind of “force” (as for Haeckel, e.g.), but 
toward the end of the century, more and more approaches discussed the problem of heredity 
as a “morphological” question about the structure of the hereditary material, how it originated 
in the course of phylogeny, and how it related to the structure of the fully developed 
organism. Surprisingly, dichotomies between “soft” or “hard” inheritance did not, as 
Rheinberger and Müller-Wille argue, play any important role, not even after Weismann’s 
theory of germ plasm. Instead, reasoning about heredity touched on organic relationships that 
were expressed in a great variety of metaphors, ranging from pianos to parliaments. In this 
respect, one can observe major shifts toward the end of the century: heredity as a direct 
relationship between ancestor and progeny became less and less important while the 
“horizontal” relationship of individuals to a shared hereditary substrate gained in prominence. 
In addition, another relational aspect was at the center of the discussion—in particular, once a 
clearer picture of the main mechanisms of cell division had emerged—namely, the 
relationship between the parts and the whole. Was the structure of the fully developed 
organism somehow prefigured in the overall architecture of the germ plasm or nucleus, as 
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Weismann believed, or were hereditary determinants relatively independent units, free to 
reappear and recombine under given circumstances, as Darwin and de Vries claimed in their 
theories of pangenesis? Frequent comparisons with the relationships among citizens, and the 
relationship between the citizen and the state, brought to the fore the concrete political issues 
with which these seemingly abstract debates resonated. 
Jean Gayon’s contribution picks up on an aspect of late-nineteenth-century 
speculations about heredity and evolution that has largely been neglected by historians, 
namely, their entanglement with different concepts of “regression.” Regression, or reversion 
to a presumed original “type,” had long been an important topic of discussion among breeders 
since it constituted a constant threat to their efforts to “improve” their breeds. In the light of 
evolutionary thinking, this turned into a problem of more general scope because regression 
seemed to suggest a kind of reversibility of modifications of species. Alfred Russel Wallace, 
for example, firmly believed that regression was nature’s response to the degenerative effects 
of domestication, whereas for Darwin, who accepted domestication as a model for natural 
selection, all variations, including apparently regressive ones, had to be understood as a 
consequence of adaptive processes. Such debates about regressive evolution, as Gayon 
suggests, have to be understood in the broader cultural context of “a period in which, in 
almost all areas of culture, progressivist thinking was harshly criticized and challenged by 
declinist thinking.” Moreover, this background explains the very different role that concepts 
of heredity came to play in different evolutionary theories. Galton endorsed a typological 
perspective, where heredity in effect limited the power of natural selection. Weismann, on the 
other hand, turned heredity into a subordinate principle of evolution since natural selection 
was for him the sole and primary force responsible for both transformation and conservation 
of species. 
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In order to understand the peculiar role that concepts of heredity have come to play 
since the second half of the nineteenth century, we have to consider not only evolutionary 
contexts but also wider shifts in theories of biological reproduction. Helga Satzinger throws 
light on the gender categories that unavoidably enter these theories. Her analysis of the 
emergence of chromosomal theories of inheritance reveals a surprising ambivalence in the 
understanding of male and female contributions to reproduction. On the one hand, the focus 
on chromosomes as the main material locus of heredity not only suggested an equal male and 
female contribution to the processes of procreation, but also supported ideas of gender 
equality in political debates. On the other hand, the chromosome theory of heredity reinstated 
a higher-level gendered dichotomy, ascribing a superior, “male” role to the chromosomes as 
compared to the auxiliary role of other cellular components, especially the cytoplasm, which 
often carried female connotations. Interpreted as a reaction against an impending 
“miniaturization” of the paternal contribution to procreation, this attributed cellular 
asymmetry created “a blind spot […] in the conceptualisation of genetics” that had lasting 
consequences for twentieth-century developments in biology. However, as Satzinger’s 
analysis of the work of Richard Goldschmidt from the 1920s demonstrates, there were also 
alternative approaches that suggested more flexible concepts of sex difference. 
1.2 Heredity in Applied Contexts 
The weight of ideology with which theories of reproduction and inheritance became charged 
around 1900 was no doubt fueled by the rapid social and demographic changes that went hand 
in hand with the second industrial revolution. For the special case of early Mendelian 
genetics, the agro-industrial contexts of scientific change have long since caught the attention 
of historians of biology. The conceptual and institutional consolidation of this discipline was 
broadly promoted by a new class of scientifically educated experts, agricultural engineers, 
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who engaged in new forms of applied research. Their work received substantial support from 
state bureaucracies and large philanthropic organizations like the Carnegie Institution and the 
Rockefeller Foundation.19 The contributing authors to the third section of this volume cast 
their net wider by analyzing how elements of the new genetic rationale were shaped by the 
biotechnologies of the second industrial revolution. A first wave of massive 
commercialization of nature’s products challenged definitions of creatorship and invention, 
and through an industrialization of such fields as breeding and microbiological applications, 
serial mass production of standardized organisms became a valuable economic factor.20 
Christophe Bonneuil provides an analysis of the rationalization of life around 1900 
that casts a new light on the familiar struggle between Darwinism and the new genetics. 
Whereas the dominant Darwinian views of the late nineteenth century emphasized fluidity, 
continuity, and individuality in the living world, the new genetics brought out opposite 
concepts: new ideas of immutable types that could be recombined, as well as notions of 
sudden ruptures or mutations. What Bonneuil calls the “pure-line paradigm” was the product 
of a new epistemic space of acceleration and the economic values of efficiency, reliability, 
and fairness. Evolutionary approaches, with their strong emphasis on slow processes and 
individuality, were regarded as insufficient to fulfill the economic needs of breeding research 
and were replaced by ideas of reliable mass reproduction, by a logic of seriality, and views 
that focused on the “horizontal,” instead of “historical,” relationships between living 
individuals. Bonneuil traces the manifestation of this new epistemic and economic space in 
programmatic statements of leading geneticists at the time, as well as in the ways in which 
research and administrative practices were organized in influential sites of industrial research, 
such as the French seed company Vilmorin or the Carlsberg Laboratory in Copenhagen. 
J. Andrew Mendelsohn explores the impact that late-nineteenth-century 
bacteriological practices had on notions of hereditary stability. He presents us with an 
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unexpected, but nevertheless convincing, comparison in order to understand the impact that 
the young field of bacteriology had on industrialization. Comparable to the “early physical 
standards laboratories of the same period,” Mendelsohn argues that “vaccine laboratories 
helped make a world in which local science could become global.” By focusing on Pasteur’s 
laboratory and his commercial agents, Mendelsohn shows how the mass production and 
worldwide distribution of vaccines supported global processes of standardization. 
Independent of, and at the same time supportive of, other approaches to inheritance like the 
search for underlying cytological mechanisms or Mendelism, bacteriological theorizing on 
hereditary variation within species considerably contributed to a shift from heredity as a 
gradual force toward a combinatorial understanding of the absence and presence of distinct 
and stable hereditary factors. The point here is that the fixity of virulent and nonvirulent 
bacterial strains was not just a matter of ontological presuppositions but imposed itself onto 
the industry in the form of a practical demand that had to be fulfilled if the safety of vaccines 
was to be warranted. Produced with immense care and effort, the attenuated strains of bacteria 
that made up vaccines thus literally came to embody heredity as fixity, that is, the ability to 
retain an unchanged character despite contextual changes. 
A key element of genetic rationality, which Bonneuil interprets with the help of Jean 
Baudrillard’s notion of “industrial simulacra,” is addressed in more detail in the chapter by 
Alain Pottage—namely, the view that manufactured organisms can be replicated reliably. 
Pottage chooses the U.S. Plant Patent Act of 1930, the first statute that treated organisms as 
inventions, for his starting point. Framing his analysis within a brief history of the parallel 
conceptual developments of ideas of “invention” and notions of inheritance since the early 
modern period, Pottage points out major shifts in how patents were legitimized when the logic 
of patenting law became relevant in plant breeding. At the center of these debates was the 
concept of “clonal plants” that fundamentally challenged the logic of novelty and the view of 
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the creative act that makes something patentable. Pottage argues that the first U.S. Plant 
Patent Act was a consequential historical moment since it turned the idea of invention “from a 
discursive to a biological medium”—whereas in chemistry, for example, the act of innovation 
that legitimized a patent was seen in the creation of a novel chemical “recipe,” but not in its 
materialization, in plant patents it was the material thing itself, the “clone,” that became 
patented. Debates about plant patents were hence shaped by ambiguities of the clone concept 
itself and the impossibility of ensuring whether or not a plant was indeed of clonal descent. 
The developments in the broad field of medical and physiological research around 
1900 provide another important field of concepts and practices which shaped hereditarian 
thinking. The chapters in this section show that the historical relationship between medicine 
and human heredity is far less straightforward than one would suspect on the basis of what we 
know about eugenics and its historical impact alone. However, with a little reflection, it 
becomes clear that medicine and Mendelian ideas of heredity are not readily compatible. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how statistical knowledge of hereditary “tendencies” applies to 
clinical contexts where individual patients are the target of diagnosis and treatment, nor can 
human populations simply be broken down into genealogical constructs like “pure lines”—an 
important precondition for any Mendelian experiment. While heredity may be abstracted from 
development for the purposes of biological inquiry, the same abstraction is highly problematic 
in medical contexts. As Ilana Löwy and Jean-Paul Gaudillière have remarked in their 
introduction to the influential volume Heredity and Infection: The History of Disease 
Transmission, as far as the epidemiology of disease is concerned, questions of infection, 
immunization, and heredity remained confounded in such a way that the vertical and the 
horizontal dimensions of the transmission of diseases could not be disentangled.21 
The complex and multilayered relationship between medical and hereditarian thinking 
has thus far not gained much attention from historians of science and medicine, apart from the 
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very special case of eugenics.22 Medical contexts such as psychiatry had developed specific 
theories of heritable diseases—with the notion of “hereditary constitution” or “diathesis” at 
the center—long before biologists, and more specifically, geneticists started to redefine ideas 
of inheritance as the presence or absence of traits. Furthermore, since the medical perspective 
in everyday practice is primarily directed toward the individual body, medical thinking about 
inheritance developed in quite different directions than in agro-industrial contexts where tools 
were developed that aimed at standardization and mass reproduction. The “narrowing down” 
of heredity to transmission and genotypic stability, as it occurred in plant breeding and 
microbiology, played almost no role in dealing with human pathologies. Physicians, when 
thinking along the lines of “hereditary dispositions,” usually had in mind something much 
more fluid and variable that was readily influenced by a wide range of cultural and natural 
preconditions. The Lamarckian idea of an inheritance of acquired characteristics was hence 
quite widespread among eugenicists, especially in socialist and Catholic contexts.23 
Conversely, early geneticists like William Bateson, Thomas Hunt Morgan, and Wilhelm 
Johannsen invested quite some energy in the refutation of what they thought was a 
widespread misconception of heredity as a transmission of parental traits, the roots of which 
could be traced to eugenic thinking.24 
Caroline Arni takes us into the field of gynecological and physiological–
embryological knowledge of procreation and generation in the late nineteenth century where 
protogenetic ideas of heredity were alive and well around 1900. In her chapter, she focuses on 
the idea of a psychic influence that the mother (and, in turn, the environment to which she 
was exposed) exerts on her unborn child. As Arni shows, the assumption that “a mother’s 
present becomes her child’s future” was still prevalent in the 1880s, continuing the ancient 
idea of the power of “maternal imagination,” an idea currently experiencing a renaissance in 
epigenetic understandings of inheritance.25 In her contribution, which presents a chapter from 
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the history of artificial insemination in the late nineteenth century, Arni explores the origins 
of what later would become labeled as “prenatal psychology.” She sheds light on the ways in 
which concepts of cultural inheritance, parental transmission, “generation,” and “procreation” 
were still deeply intermingled in physiological and embryological research fields that were 
concerned with the “coming into being of new human beings.” Even if the act of procreation 
was widely understood as a material process involving the union of two cells—a historical 
precondition in order to advance medical practices of artificial insemination—the separation 
of hereditary transmission from the act of procreation and its contingencies never quite 
happened in gynecology and embryology. 
Jean-Paul Gaudillière and Ilana Löwy identify, in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, a similar mismatch between new genetic research and the persistence in practice of 
older ideas. Although, as they emphasize, “during the first half of the twentieth century, 
‘heredity’ was omnipresent in medicine, […] invariant ‘factors’ transmitted according to 
Mendelian rules were very rare.” From their detailed analysis of clinical research on diseases 
such as anaphylaxis, cancer, or “mongolism” in France, Great Britain, and the United States 
between 1900 and 1940, they draw the conclusion that most physicians were well aware of 
what was going on in experimental research in genetics but most of them found these 
investigations irrelevant to the medical understanding of diseases with a hereditary 
component. Besides the usual incommensurability of experimental and clinical practice, 
Gaudillière and Löwy refer to a further reason why Mendelism was widely received as a new 
order of knowledge but had almost no practical effects on medicine, a historical situation they 
describe as “Mendelism without Mendel’s laws.” For professional reasons, medical 
researchers were interested in hereditary diseases, where the disease itself had priority over its 
mode of transmission and left little room for the geneticist’s freedom to focus on traits that 
reveal clear-cut Mendelian transmission patterns.26 Particularly in France, genetic thinking 
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was thus regularly accompanied by physiological approaches until World War II. As the case 
of the physiologist and Nobel Prize winner Charles Richet shows, the belief in the existence 
of constant hereditary traits did not preclude the promotion of a new version of humoral 
theories in which “acquired traits” became chemically inscribed in the body. 
This does not mean that Mendelism had no impact in medicine. However, as Bernd 
Gausemeier’s chapter on developments within German psychiatry demonstrates, the very 
subject of human heredity had to be shaped in specific ways before it could become amenable 
to Mendelian analysis. Gausemeier distinguishes three major, successive forms in which 
human heredity presented itself to psychiatrists—asylum statistics, family pedigrees, and 
statistical cohorts expressly constructed for the purpose of Mendelian analysis. Since the 
establishment of psychiatric clinics in the early nineteenth century, psychiatrists regularly 
recorded and analyzed data on their patients in order to assess the relative importance of 
“hereditary dispositions” for different forms of mental diseases. Transmission, as Gausemeier 
argues, was not yet the main focus in the study of degenerative diseases while psychiatrists 
were still occupied with definitions for these diseases. This changed in the years around 1900 
when pedigrees moved center stage in psychiatric discussions. However, despite the fact that 
pedigrees were often used to demonstrate the Mendelian transmission of mental diseases—the 
most notorious example being provided by Charles Davenport and his Eugenics Record 
Office at Cold Spring Harbor27—they ultimately turned out not to provide adequate proof of 
Mendelian ratios. The incompatibility of genealogy and Mendelian genetics was first fully 
realized by medical statistician Wilhelm Weinberg and the psychiatrist Ernst Rüdin. Their 
“sibling method” aimed at an exact calculation of the occurrence of a well-defined 
pathological trait in two successive, coherent generations of a large number of families. 
Weinberg and Rüdin treated their populations as if they had been the product of a large 
number of independently executed Mendelian breeding experiments. 
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1.3 Origins of Mendelism 
The last set of chapters in this volume revisits the origin of Mendelian genetics. The 
“delayed” reception of Mendel’s work has been a topic that has intrigued many in the history 
of the life sciences.28 Equally impressive is the speed with which Mendel’s rediscovery led to 
the consolidation of a new discipline within the life sciences that was often hailed as 
revolutionary. However, if we give due consideration to the results of the previous sections in 
this collection, it becomes clear that in fact Mendelism entailed conditions and drawbacks that 
precluded many practitioners from readily adopting it. In order to carry out Mendelian 
experiments and ascertain Mendelian ratios, organisms had to be first inbred, then crossbred, 
and finally raised in large numbers. Humans, but also many agriculturally significant 
organisms, could not easily be subjected to such practices. This is one of the main reasons 
why animal breeding and clinical medicine became thoroughly “geneticized” only well after 
World War II, and why statistical approaches, developed by the so-called biometrical school 
long before the advent of Mendelism, persisted in these areas to finally merge with population 
and quantitative genetics in the mid-twentieth century.29 
One explanation for the success of Mendelism, proposed long ago by Garland E. 
Allen, relies on its appeal to biologists trained in the experimentalist traditions of nineteenth-
century biology.30 Several features of the rhetoric in which early Mendelians engaged to 
bolster the credentials of their new science indeed resonate with an experimental style of 
reasoning. First of all, there was the rejection of historical understandings of heredity. 
Physiological concepts of hereditary particles as “living units” that reproduced and evolved 
were replaced by genetic concepts of discrete factors that could be recombined but in essence 
remained unaffected by the combinations they entered. The new geneticists thus expelled life 
from hereditary units, a stance that also came to the fore in frequent references to the thriving 
field of synthetic chemistry. Analogies between heredity and chemistry, between reproduction 
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and recombination, became widespread on both sides of the Atlantic and across zoological 
and botanical disciplines.31 Mendelism was thus defined by a new set of experimental tools 
and research objects, a new style of how to do experiments, how to collect data, and how to 
apply statistical analyses. One of the three “rediscoverers” of Mendel, the botanist Carl 
Correns, expressed the peculiar epistemic status of what misleadingly became known as 
Mendel’s “laws” when he—even years after Mendel’s rediscovery—stated that Mendelism 
“despite its name is not a theory at all but a group of facts [Tatsachen] that comes before any 
interpretation.”32 
Staffan Müller-Wille and Marsha L. Richmond make a similar point by following the 
research trajectories of William Bateson and Wilhelm Johannsen, two figures that played 
crucial roles in the consolidation of genetics as a discipline, across the annus mirabilis of 
1900. Bateson and Johannsen converged on Mendelism from extremely different starting 
points, both institutionally and theoretically, and they both stuck to their original research 
agendas with a certain tenacity, even after accepting the basic tenets of Mendelism. 
Comparing their careers before and after 1900 reveals, however, that Mendelian experiments, 
first and foremost, offered a wealth of opportunities to cross the boundaries between general 
biology and its application to problems of industry and agriculture. “What Mendel’s paper 
paradigmatically incorporated,” the authors argue, “was thus less a certain, dogmatic view of 
living nature, but a certain way of doing science and making one’s reputation.” The most 
striking element of this new way of doing biology was its constructivism, its reliance on a 
heterogeneous set of tools and methods—most importantly among them, the use of “pure 
lines” of organisms for the construction of populations—that formed an experimental system 
of great versatility. While Mendelism thus clearly shared a lot with the way in which the exact 
sciences approach nature through instruments and apparatuses that create phenomena of 
interest, it was not being reductionist in the usual sense of reducing biological phenomena to 
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physicochemical processes—fertilization, after all, remained an irreducible element of 
Mendelian experiments. 
The complex research dynamics that Mendelian genetics, even in its early years, was 
thus able to generate is explored in the chapter by Luis Campos and Alexander von Schwerin 
on the botanist Albert Francis Blakeslee, second director of the Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory and the German plant geneticist Erwin Baur. Campos and Schwerin stress a 
historical point that can hardly be overstated, namely, that classical genetics cannot be 
equated with the “gene-centrism” that the historiography has suggested for Thomas Hunt 
Morgan’s Drosophila school. With an eye on the possibilities of “genetic engineering,” 
Blakeslee was interested in exploring how new variations and new species occur in evolution, 
which led him to artificially induce (with the help of Radium) and investigate chromosomal 
mutations in Datura (jimsonweed). Baur, on the other hand, had started to work with 
Antirrhinum majus (the snapdragon) in the context of an integrative view of how heredity and 
environment act together in producing minute variations. His main idea was that not only 
were the main traits in plants Mendelian units, but even the smallest variations corresponded 
to Mendelian rules. Both scientists developed dynamic experimental systems that turned, in 
the course of two decades, into a techno-epistemological realm of what the authors call an 
“industry of mutations.” Moreover, their conceptual work shows that within Mendelian 
approaches, the focus on the level of the gene was not at all the only option nor even the 
dominant one. Since Blakeslee was concerned with variations on the level of chromosomes, 
and Baur was searching for so-called Kleinmutationen (minute mutations), their experiments 
focused on scales above and below that of the classical gene. 
Christina Brandt and Judy Johns Schloegel’s chapter about Paramecium research in 
early genetics resumes the well-known studies by Jan Sapp and Jonathan Harwood, which 
pointed to differing styles of genetic thought.33 Considering the different scientific research 
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contexts in the United States and in Germany, and again comparing the work of two 
scientists—Herbert Spencer Jennings and Victor Jollos—the authors argue that Paramecium 
became an early model system in genetics that was treated as a material representation of the 
unknown entity of the genotype. The authors thus call into question another widely held view 
about classical genetics, namely, that it was based on a clear-cut separation of a stable 
genotype and the phenotype as the product of fluctuating environmental conditions. The first 
two decades of the twentieth century saw a surge of newly coined terms and concepts, 
entailing much more than a mere distinction of genotype and phenotype. Among these new 
concepts were not only “mutation,” and “clone”—terms that are still central concepts in 
today’s life science—but also a variety of concepts and theories that are forgotten today. The 
origin of such different concepts as “norm of reaction” (Richard Woltereck), “biotype” 
(Jennings), or “plasmotype” (Jollos) illustrates that for many scientists the relationship 
between the organism and the environment was still the main focus, and that a lot of scientists 
believed that a conceptual genotype–phenotype distinction alone was not sufficient to fully 
understand heredity and development. As Brandt and Schloegel demonstrate, this was not 
least due to the fact that the genealogical constructs with which these geneticists worked often 
came to represent for them material instantiations of inheritance. “Clones” and “pure lines,” 
especially in the case of unicellular organisms, embodied processes of inheritance to such a 
degree that the analytic distinctions between genotype and phenotype often collapsed. 
1.4 Genetics and Heredity 
In hindsight, it is certainly no overstatement to claim that the gene became the “central 
organizing theme of twentieth-century biology.”34 The ground was certainly well prepared for 
its reception, as many contributions to this volume show, by the centrality afforded, in the 
wake of the theory of evolution, to the question of the laws governing variation and 
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inheritance in populations, and the wider ramifications such laws held for understandings of 
societal progress. Although undoubtedly speculative, nineteenth-century theories of heredity 
bestowed onto twentieth-century genetics a spectrum of ideas about the constitution of the 
peculiar space in which germs and hereditary dispositions circulated. Above all, they showed 
that this space could not be reduced to the individual relationships between ancestral 
progenitors and their descendants. Instead, questions focused on the relationship between 
populations and a common hereditary substrate. The reason for this “devaluation of ancestry” 
in favor of a view that sees (cultural as well as biological) inheritance as a common stock of 
dispositions seems to lie in the association of heredity with the future rather than the past, 
with projection rather than with legitimization, associations that occurred in the context of the 
all-pervading late-nineteenth-century theme of progress. Prominent geneticists like Wilhelm 
Johannsen saw Mendelism as a way to free technology and society from the weight of 
tradition. Mendelism’s reductionist view of the organism as composed of modular and largely 
independent, to some degree even autonomous, entities was prefigured by the debates about 
cell theory in the nineteenth century and resonated with an industrial culture that placed value 
on the specificity and reproducibility of innovations. If one were able to atomize life to the 
degree that its elements would not be affected substantially by the combinations they entered 
in the course of history, then there would be virtually no limit to the future production of 
innovations through combination. The future—and this, notably, included the future shape of 
humans—could be made, or constructed, thereby overcoming the power that history and 
tradition used to have over life. 
And yet, the origin of genetics remains underdetermined by its nineteenth-century 
forebears, as evinced by the fact that a variety of non- or pregenetic conceptions of heredity 
persisted far beyond 1900. This is true even in practical research fields like breeding, eugenic 
counseling, and medical therapy. It should not be forgotten that the gene was initially a rather 
Page 24 of 37 
narrowly defined conceptual tool that served to investigate patterns of trait transmission. Only 
eventually did it come to be deployed successfully for the investigation of other phenomena 
as well, ranging from problems of plant pathology to the theory of natural selection.35 To 
understand this process, another set of factors has to be taken into consideration, one that 
points to a transformation of the life sciences on the same scale as the much better understood 
“laboratory revolution” in medicine.36 Whereas biology had established itself around 1800 in 
contradistinction to physics and chemistry, it now pursued its agenda by turning the methods 
of the physical and chemical sciences to the study of particular organisms. The idiosyncratic 
properties of these organisms held the promise of the experimental characterization of the 
most general properties of living beings.37 What plainly characterized the new dynamics of 
research around 1900, and what evidently distinguished the new genetics from earlier 
approaches to heredity, was the emphasis on doing experimental studies on variation and 
inheritance; the concomitant occurrence of new methodological tools; and, most importantly, 
the resulting emergence of new research objects. These objects were part of a new scientific 
endeavor for which a distinction between applied and pure science, between the artificial and 
the natural, made no sense. The new research objects were characterized by being both highly 
artificial, since they were results of procedures of standardization, purification, and controlled 
variation, and natural, since they were regarded as representing hidden, natural entities. 
This is reflected in the fact that much fundamental genetic research in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did take place in applied contexts like seed 
production, breeding of yeast and cereals for large-scale beer production, mass production of 
vaccines, efforts to further public health, administration of psychiatric hospitals, or eugenic 
programs. Increasing levels of division of labor and bureaucratic control in these areas—the 
seed company Vilmorin in France had 400 employees around 1900—led to the establishment 
of a culture of expertise and scientificity. In these contexts, Mendelism featured as one of 
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many methodologies to realize values that were endorsed by this culture, like analyticity, 
exactitude, calculability, and predictability. Breeders and eugenicists in particular shared a 
combinatorial approach that held a promise for the transparent and reliable production of 
intergenerational effects. Synthetic chemistry, not physics, provided the model science in this 
context. An important property of this culture of expertise was its obsession with purity. 
Purity connects a number of issues that were at stake. It was an instrument of control, as 
results could be “checked” against their inputs. It enabled practitioners to “fix” characteristics 
and create identifiable and specifiable products. It created a set of discrete and stable life 
forms, rather than an uncontrolled continuum of variations. 
This obsession with purity confers upon genetics a curious status within the life 
sciences. Mendel’s laws do not at all describe what happens “naturally”—or “happens all or 
most of the time,” as Aristotle would have formulated it. As R. A. Fisher long ago argued, 
Mendel’s achievement rather consisted in having demonstrated “the truth of his factorial 
system.”38 Like the “pure” substances and compounds that populate the shelves of chemical 
laboratories, “genes” are entities that serve both as the target and the instrument of successful 
experimental manipulation. With the advent of genetics in the twentieth century, heredity did 
not therefore become further entrenched as an inescapable bequest—or burden, depending on 
one’s perspective—from the past. It was rather turned into the malleable, technical object of 
desires and fears that haunt us to this day. 
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